We discuss the no-arbitrage conditions in a general framework for discretetime models of financial markets with proportional transaction costs and general information structure. We extend the results of Kabanov and al. (2002) , and Schachermayer (2004) to the case where bid-ask spreads are not known with certainty. In the "no-friction" case, we retrieve the result of .
Introduction
While the "insider trading" problem, where the agent's filtration H is strictly bigger than the asset's filtration F S , has been widely studied in the recent literature, see e.g. [1] , [5] , [8] and the references therein, less care has been given to the imperfect information case where H does not contain F S . Such situations may arise for instance if the small investor has not a direct access to the market. In this case, his orders can be executed with a delay and therefore at a price which is not known in advance, see [4] and [12] . From the point of view of the arbitrage theory, the "insider trading" case is well known. Indeed, all the necessary and sufficient condition for the absence of arbitrage opportunities available in the case H = F S apply to the general case F S ⊂ H. In particular, the usual "noarbitrage" conditions imply that, roughly speaking (see [6] and [7] for precise results), prices must be semi-martingales in the filtration H and that there must be an equivalent probability measure Q under which they are (Q, H)-local martingales.
The case of imperfect information where H ⊂ F S and H = F S is much more difficult to handle. In particular, the arguments of [6] do not work in this situation. Even in the case of infinite discrete time, the proof of [18] does not apply. However, in finite discrete time, it was noticed in [12] that the proof of the Dallang-Morton-Willinger theorem reported in [10] still holds up to minor modifications for any given filtration H. In this case, the no-arbitrage condition is equivalent to the existence of a probability measure Q such that the optional projection under Q, (E Q [S t | H t ]) t , of the asset prices (S t ) t on H = (H t ) t is a (Q, H)-martingale. The aim of this paper is to extend this result to the case where exchanges are subject to proportional transaction costs. In the recent literature, such models have been widely studied, from the seminal work of [9] to the recent papers [11] , [13] , [14] , [17] , [16] , [15] and [2] among others. The recent abstract formulation consists in introducing a sequence of random closed convex cones (K t ) t and describing the wealth process as V t = s≤t ξ s with ξ s ∈ −K s a.s. The "usual" example is given by
where M d + denotes the set of square d-dimensional matrices with non-negative entries. Here π ij should be interpreted as the costs in units of asset i one has to pay to obtain one unit of asset j. If we allow to throw out money, an exchange ξ t at time t is then affordable if ξ t ∈ −K t a.s. In the case of imperfect information, i.e. π is not H-adapted, this approach cannot be used since K is no longer H-adapted. Hence, we have to change the modelisation. Instead of considering the ξ's as the controls, we have to rewrite them as ξ Because the ξ may not be adapted the proofs of [13] , [14] and [17] does not apply to this setting and, in contrast to [12] , we have to work a bit more to extend their results.
In the above model, we fix the number of units η 
where η is H-adapted process with values in the set M d of square d-dimensional matrices. Here, τ ij stands for the costs in units of asset i one has to pay to obtain one unit of asset j, before to pay the transaction costs. The transaction costs η
are paid in units of the sold asset i. With the above notation, one has π
This corresponds to
2)
Contrary to the model (1.1), we can now fix the number of units of asset i we want to sell against units of asset j by fixing η ji t < 0 so that |η ji t | coincides with the amount of exchanged units of i. Once again, in the case of perfect information both models are equivalent, but this is no more true if τ and/or λ are not H-adapted. One could also argue that paying the transaction costs in units of the asset which is sold, as in (1.2), is not the same thing than paying these costs in units of the asset which is bought. Here again one could consider a more general model which pertains for different costs structures.
In order to take into account all these different situations, we propose a general formalism where the wealth process V is written as V t = s≤t F s (η s ), for some sequence of random maps F = (F t ) t . Here, η is H-adapted process with values in a closed convex cone A of M d (we have in mind to take A = M d , however, in order to take also the model (1.1) into account it is more convenient to allow for the possibility of having A = M d + ). We make no assumption on the filtration under which F is adapted. Thus, this approach pertains for the cases of "insider trading" or imperfect information and for all other mixed cases (for instance, we can imagine that we do not observe the price of the assets but have some extra information which is not contained in the filtration induced by the processes of exchange rates. Observe that, if we know that the price of some asset will double between today and tomorrow, we can make an arbitrage without knowing this price -assuming that transaction costs are reasonable).
In Section 2, we study the no-arbitrage conditions considered in [13] , [14] and [17] in this abstract setting. Examples of application are provided in Section 3
The abstract formulation
Throughout this paper, we fix a finite time horizon T ∈ N and consider a complete probability space (Ω, F , P) supporting a filtration H = (H t ) t∈T with T = {0, . . . , T }. Importantly, we only assume that H T ⊂ F . In particular, most of the processes considered in this paper need not be H-adapted. In all this paper, inequalities involving random variables must be understood in the P − a.s. sense, if it is clear from the context, and inclusive relations between elements of F are assumed to hold up to P-null sets.
The model
We consider a closed convex cone A of M d , d ≥ 1, and denote by F the set of continuous
.
We then define F as the set of F -measurable sequences F = (F t ) t∈T such that F t takes a.s. values in F, for each t ∈ T. Observe that HF 1 implies that F (0) = 0.
set of E-valued G-measurable random variables. For a process ξ such that ξ t ∈ N t (F ) for all t ∈ T, we shall simply write ξ ∈ N(F ). We shall similarly write ξ ∈ N 0 (F ) if
Given a process ξ with values in R d , we finally define
Observe that we do not impose that the above processes are H-adapted: F t , ξ t and V t (ξ t ) need not be H t -measurable.
Remark 2.1 In financial applications, F i t (η t ) will correspond to the change in the number of units of asset i held in the portfolio V (ξ) at time t. This results from the different exchanges η ij t and η ji t made between the i-th asset and the other j-th assets, under the self-financing condition and after paying the transaction costs. In this case, A t (F ) stands for the set of contingent claims, labeled in physical units, that can be super-hedged by trading up to time t and starting with an initial endowment equal to 0. This formalism applies to model (1.2) with A = M d and
This model will be further discussed in Section 3.
In this section, we provide sufficient conditions under which A T (F ) is closed in probability and study abstract versions of the no-arbitrage conditions of [13] , [14] and [17] .
Sufficient conditions for the closedness of A T (F )
In all this subsection, we shall assume that the sequence of random maps F satisfies the following conditions:
We call the first condition KP as "key property" as it results from what was called "key Lemma" in [14] , see condition (iii) in [14] and Lemma 3 in [13] . In Subsection 2.4, we shall provide sufficient conditions for this property to hold.
In financial models with transaction costs, the second condition can be understood as follows:
means that the exchange ξ t is reversible, i.e. starting with the endowment ξ t we can make immediate exchanges so as to come back to 0. Intuitively, this means that η t corresponds to exchanges between assets that can be exchanged freely, i.e. without paying transaction costs. In this case, we should be able to do the opposite operation, −η t , to reverse these transactions. In the formalism of [13] and [14] such an assumption is not required and the only important property is that if ξ t ∈ N 0 t (F ) then −ξ t ∈ N t (F ), which, in their setting, implies that −ξ t is also an admissible exchange.
Since, in our case, −ξ t may not be H t -measurable, we need to rewrite it as some F t (η t ) for some suitableη t ∈ L 0 (A; H t ). In view of the above discussion, it is natural to assume that such aη t should be simply given by −η t .
The aim of this section is to show that it implies the closedness (in probability) of the set A T (F ).
For the reader's convenience, we first recall the following Lemma whose proof can be found in [10] .
there is an increasing sequence of random variables
In the following, we shall denote by L 0 (A; H) the set of A-valued H-adapted processes.
We claim that A T,T is closed in probability (see 3. below) and use an inductive argument. We assume that A t+1,T is closed in probability for some t ≤ T −1 and show that A t,T is closed too. Let (g n ) n≥1 be a sequence in A t,T which converges a.
with ξ n := F (η n ) and η n = 0 on {0, . . . , t−1}. Set α n := η n t and B := {lim inf n→∞ α n < ∞}. Since B ∈ H t , we can work separately on B and B c , by considering the two sequences (η n 1I B , r n 1I B ) n≥1 and (η n 1I B c , r n 1I B c ) n≥1 , and therefore do as if either
, and, by assumption, the later is closed in probability, we can find someξ ∈ N(F ) such thatξ = 0 on {0, . . . , t} and
< ∞ a.s., we can assume (after possibly passing to a H t -measurable random subsequence as above) thatη n t converges a.s. to some element of L 0 (A; H t ). Arguing as above, using HF 1 and observing that g n /(α n ∨ 1) converges a.s. to 0, we can find someη ∈ L 0 (A; H), such that
From KP, we deduce thatr = 0 andξ s := F s (η s ) ∈ N 0 s (F ) for all s ≥ t. Since η t = 1, there is partition of B into (possibly empty) disjoint sets (B ij ) i,j≤d such that
2) and the fact thatr = 0, we get
. Hence, we have constructed a new sequence (ξ n := F (η n ),r n := r n +ř n ) n≥1 for which (2.1) holds and (η n t ) ij = 0 on B ij . Repeating this argument recursively on the different B ij 's and arguing as in [13] , we can finally obtain, in a finite number of operations, a sequence (
. Applying the argument of 1. above then concludes the proof. 3. The fact that A T,T is closed in probability is obtained by similar arguments. Given a sequence (g
separately the event sets {lim inf n→∞ η n T < ∞} and {lim inf n→∞ η n T = ∞} as in 1. and 2., we can construct a new sequence (η n T ,r n ) n≥1 such that F T (η n T ) −r n = g n and lim inf n→∞ η n T < ∞. By possibly passing to a random subsequence, we can then assume thatη n T converges a.s. to someη T ∈ L 0 (A; H T ) and thereforer n converges to
Abstract weak no-arbitrage property
In this section, we use Proposition 2.1 to provide a dual characterization of the weak no-arbitrage condition studied in [11] and [13] , see also the references therein,
As observed in [17] , in financial models, it corresponds to the usual no-arbitrage condition. Here, we keep the notations of [11] and [13] to enhance the difference with the notions of strict no-arbitrage and robust no-arbitrage that we shall consider in Subsection 2.4.
We denote by e ij the element of M d + whose component (i, j) is equal to one and all others are equal to 0, i, j ≤ d. In addition to KP, we make the following assumption on A.
Here, x + and x − stands for the positive and negative parts of x. Condition 1. can be viewed as a convention. The reason for imposing this assumption will be clear in Section 3. In the examples of Section 3, e ij (resp. −e ij ) will correspond to a transfer of units of asset i so as obtain (resp. get rid of) one unit of asset j. Since an order, η, can be viewed as a composition of single transfers of the form e ij or −e ij , condition 2. simply means that the induced changes F t (η) in the portfolio should correspond to the combination of the changes F t (e ij ) and F t (−e ij ) associated to these single transfers.
Observe from HF 1 , HF 2 that, for all i, j, k ≤ d,
since F (e ji − e ji ) = F (0) = 0.
We shall also assume in the sequel that
Remark 2.2 Observe that we can always reduce to this case by passing to the equivalent probability measure whose density with respect to P is defined by H/E [H] with H := exp(− i,j≤d t∈T F t (e ij ) + F t (−e ij ) ).
Remark 2.3
If F ∈ F satisfies HA, then it is completely characterized by the family {F (e ij ), F (−e ij )} i,j≤d .
Dual characterization of NA
Here "·" denotes the natural scalar product of R d . By (2.4) and HA, these conditional expectations are well defined.
We then define D(F ) as the set of elements Z of L ∞ (R d ; F ) satisfying Z i > 0 for all i ≤ d and such that for all η ∈ L 0 (A; H) and t ∈ T The proof will be provided in the next subsection.
In order to relate the above result to the literature, we now provide an alternative characterization of the set D(F ). To Z ∈ L ∞ ((0, ∞) d ; F ), we associate the H-martingalē
Then, to F ∈ F satisfying HA, we associateF (·; Z) defined as the element of F satisfying HA and
where, for E ⊂ R d , cone{E} is the smallest closed convex cone that contains E. We also
In the case of perfect information, i.e. F is H-adapted,K(F, Z) :
coincides with the sequence of random "solvency" cones defined in [13] and [14] . The following proposition combined with Theorem 2.1 then extends the results of [13] , [14] and [17] to our context, see also Remark 2.4 below.
Proposition 2.2 Let F ∈ F be such that HN
, for all t ∈ T. 1. We fix t ∈ T. SinceZ ·F (·; Z) =F (·; Z), it follows thatF t (δe ij ; Z) ≤ 0 for all
it satisfiesF t (η; Z) = 0 and r = 0. Set ξ := F t (η). We claim that ξ / ∈ N 0 t (F ), which, in view of D 2 , leads to a contradiction. To see this observe from HN 0 thatF t (η; Z) = −F t (−η; Z) whenever ξ ∈ N 0 t (F ). By HA, this implies thatξ ∈K 
SinceZ t ∈ i,j≤dK ij * t (F, Z), we deduce that
We claim that
In view of (2.6) and HA, this implies that F t (η) = −F t (−η) and therefore ξ ∈ N 0 t (F ). It remains to prove (2.7). Fix i, j ≤ d. SinceZ t ∈ ri(K ij * t (F, Z)), we must have {F t (e ij ; Z) = 0} = {F t (−e ij ; Z) = 0} =: B ij . If (e ij , −e ij ) ∈ A × A, then (2.3) implies that F t (e ij ) + F t (−e ij ) = 0 on B ij , recall that Z has a.s. positive components. If e ij / ∈ A, then F t (e ij ) = 0, recall HA, andF t (−e ij ; Z) = 0 implies F t (−e ij ) = 0 since otherwisē Z t would not take values in ri(K 
Proof of Theorem 2.1
The two following Lemmas prepare for the proof of Theorem 2.1 which will be concluded at the end of this subsection.
Proof. We use a resursive agument as in [13] .
Observe that we have no problem in defining the above conditional expectations thanks to (2.4) and HA. 
Proof. We follow the argument of Lemma 4 in [14] . Observe from HF 1 and
w , we deduce from the Hahn-Banach separation theorem together with a classical exhaustion argument, see e.g. Section 3 in [18] , that there is some Z ∈ L ∞ (R d ; F ) with
T (F ). Let Z denote the set of such random variables Z. 1. It is clear that (i) holds for all Z ∈ Z. Indeed, assume that for some η ∈ L 0 (A; H) and s ∈ T, B := {F s (η s ; Z) > 0} has positive probability. Setg := H s F s (η s )1I B with
we get a contradiction to the definition of Z. 2. By the same argument as in Lemma 4 in [14] , we can find some Z µ such that
Sending k → ∞, we would then get
Proof of Theorem 2.1. 1. The first implication follows from Lemma 2.2 since the elements of D(F ) have a.s. positive entries. 2. We now prove the converse implication. Let Z ij,t
such that (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2.3 hold for the process (e ij 1I s=t ) s∈T (resp. (−e ij 1I s=t ) s∈T ), i, j ≤ d and t ∈ T. We claim thatẐ := t∈T i,j≤d Z ij,t
belongs to D(F ). Clearly, it satisfies D 1 . Fix η ∈ L 0 (A; H t ) for some t ∈ T, and recall from HA that
and (2.8), we then deduce that
Strict and robust no-arbitrage conditions
In this section, we study the other no-arbitrage conditions considered in [13] , [14] and [17] .
Following [13] , we say that F ∈ F satisfies the strict no-arbitrage condition if one has
and that the model has "efficient frictions" if
As in [17] , we also define a robust version of the no-arbitrage property. We say that F ∈ F satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition, NA r , if there is some sequence G ∈ F such that for all η ∈ L 0 (A; H), t ∈ T and i ≤ d:
In financial models, the last condition can be interpreted as the existence of a model with slightly lower transaction costs (for those that are not already equal to 0) in which the weak no-arbitrage condition still holds, see [17] .
In this section, we first show that these properties imply the condition KP used above. We will then be able to use Theorem 2.1 to provide a dual characterization of the absence of arbitrage opportunities in the spirit of [13] , [14] and [17] , see Theorem 2.2 below.
Lemma 2.4 Let F ∈ F be such that one of the above conditions holds:
(ii) NA s and EF.
Then, KP holds.
, setη := η +η andξ := F (η).
1. We start with NA r . Let G be as in the definition of NA r and defineξ ′ := G(η). By 
, this leads to a contradiction to the fact that NA w holds for G. Hence,
and we must have V T (ξ ′ ) = 0 so that V T (ξ) + V T (ξ) = 0.
2. We now assume that NA s and EF hold. Assume that, for some t ∈ T, 
We now prove that D(F ) = ∅ implies NA r . To avoid unnecessary complications, we first consider the case where (e ji , −e ji ) ∈ A × A for all i, j ≤ d. We shall explain in 2.d. how to adapt our arguments to the general case. Fix Z ∈ D(F ) and consider the random variables δ + ji,t := −F t (e ji ; Z) and δ
It follows from
We claim that, for all i, j ≤ d and t ∈ T,
Indeed, by construction, we have δ + ji,t > 0 on {F t (e ji ; Z) < 0} and δ − ji,t > 0 on {F t (−e ji ; Z) < 0}. Now, set B + := {F t (e ji ; Z) = 0} and B − := {F t (−e ji ; Z) = 0}. From D 2 and HN 0 , we deduce that F t (e ji 1I B + ) = −F t (−e ji 1I B + ) so thatF t (−e ji ; Z) = 0 on B + . This shows that B + ⊂ B − . Similarly, we can show the converse inclusion, which implies (2.10).
We can now construct G. For all i, j, k ≤ d, we set
It satisfies HF 1 . By (2.3), it also satisfies the condition 1. of NA r , recall (2.9). It remains to check that HF 2 , 2. and 3. of NA r hold.
2.a. We first check HF
In the case where β ≥ α ≥ 0, we obtain the same result. Since G satisfies HA, this shows that it also satisfies HF 2 . 2.b. We now check 2. of NA r . Set η ∈ L 0 (A; H t ) and t ∈ T such that F t (η) / ∈ N 0 t (F ). We must show that, with positive probability, we can find k ≤ d such that G In this section, we apply the above results to three examples of discrete time financial markets with proportional transaction costs. The first one corresponds to a "security market" where it is possible to make transactions only between a "non-risky asset" and some "risky" ones, direct transactions between the "risky assets" being prohibited. The two other ones correspond to "currency markets" where transactions between all assets (interpreted as currencies) are possible. The information of the financial agent is modeled by the filtration H and a strategy is a process η ∈ L 0 (A; H).
Security market
We take the first asset as a numéraire and consider an M Then, we set F t (·) = f (·; π t ) for t ∈ T. For the sake of simplicity, we take A = M d .
Observe that HA and HF 1 trivially holds, and that the condition π 1i ≥ π i1 , i ≤ d, implies HF 2 .
If positive, the quantity η Proof. Fix t ∈ T and η ∈ L 0 (M d ; H t ) such that F t (η) ∈ N 0 t (F ). We have to show that F t (−η) = −F t (η). By definition, there isη ∈ L 0 (M d ; H t ) such that F t (η) = −F t (η).
Currency market #2
The model (1.1) discussed in the introduction corresponds to the one presented in the previous subsection with f defined by f i (a; ρ, ℓ) = 
